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THE IMPACT OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY UPON THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
JoHN F. SUTTON*
Unauthorized practice of law problems can be divided into three
general categories: the practice of law by laymen; the practice of law
by corporations and other groups; and the practice of law by lawyers in
states in which they are not licensed to practice. Although a discussion
directly concerning the three problem areas is outside the scope of the
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility,1 the provisions of the Code
do have some impact upon the problems encountered in each category.
The scope of the proposed Code parallels that of the present American
Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, which the Code will
succeed if it is adopted by the ABA House of Delegates.' The Code is
* Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin; Reporter for the Special
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards.
'In 1964, the American Bar Association created the Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards, giving it the responsibilities of evaluating the
ABA Canons of Ethics and of proposing any changes or additions foumd desirable.
On January 15, 1969, the committee released its preliminary draft of a proposed
new Code of Professional Responsibility, designed to replace entirely the present
Canons of Professional Ethics.
The proposed new Code contains only nine canons, each being a short statement
in one sentence of a general proposition regarding the professional responsibility
of lawyers. Following each canon is a textual development, tenned "Ethical
Considerations," of the various professional obligations flowing from that general
proposition. Following each of the nine statements of Ethical Considerations
are one or more related "Disciplinary Rules."
The Disciplinary Rules are designed to constitute a body of specific, penal,
substantive law enforceable in disciplinary proceedings. By contrast, the Ethical
Considerations are not ethical rules to be enforced by sanctions; rather they are
a text for the information of the lawyers who seek to understand what lawyers
should be doing if they are to render to society the services they should render.
See generally ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble 1-2 (Prelim. Draft, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
2 While the scope of the Code parallels the present Canons, the Code contains
many innovations; some examples are: (1) the Ethical Considerations of Canon
6 beseech the lawyer to use a contingent fee "only in those instances where the
arrangement will be beneficial to the client." Id., Canon 6-Ethical Considera-
tions 6, at 61. (2) A lawyer who limits his practice to a single field of law
may so state on his letterhead, shingle, and professional card. Id., Discip. R.
2-105 (A) (4), at 25. (3) A lawyer is urged not to accept employment which he
cannot handle competently, id., Canon 4-Ethical Consideratioins, at 50, and he
is subject to disciplinary action for neglecting a client's work. Id., Discip. R. 4-101
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concerned exclusively with the conduct of lawyers. It does not include
prohibitions against the practice of law by laymen,' it does not establish
requirements for being admitted to practice, and it does not contain
reciprocity provisions for allowing lawyers to practice where not licensed;
these are functions of the individual states. However, the Code does
deal with the aspects of conduct by lawyers that concern unauthorized
practice. Thus it specifically touches upon aiding laymen to practice law,
accepting employment to provide legal services to members and bene-
ficiaries 'of corporations and other groups, and practicing law in states
where one is not licensed.
The principal canon of the proposed Code pertaining to unauthorized
practice is Canon 3. Canons 2 and 6 are also relevant. Proposed Canon
3, which is followed by related ethical considerations and disciplinary
rules, states: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized
Practice of Law."' The ethical considerations include discussions of the
rationale for restricting the practice of law to lawyers, of factors involved
in determining what constitutes the practice of law, of instances when
a layman may properly perform law-related tasks, and of the need for less
restrictive state regulations pertaining to out-of-state lawyers. Generally,
the disciplinary rules prohibit aiding a layman to practice law.5 The
provisions of Canons 2 and 6 are relevant to unauthorized practice insofar
as they deal with the provision of legal services by lawyers in the form
of a professional legal corporation or in cooperation with a corporation
or other group.
The continuing vitality of unauthorized practice problems may be due
in part to the difficulty in viewing unauthorized practice in a proper
perspective. It has become such an emotionally-charged subject that some
lawyers seem unable to overcome an instinctive negative reaction and
to advance to a detached analysis of a particular situation and its harmful
consequences, if any, to the public.' The emotional reaction may stem
(A) (4), at 50-51. (4) Each lawyer is enjoined to participate in efforts to im-
prove laws and the legal system in order to make the legal system more responsive
to the needs of society. Id., Canon 8-Ethical Considerations, at 107-109.
' "The Canons of Ethics do not apply to corporations or non-attorneys." Touchy
v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968).
"Obviously the Canons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules cannot
apply to non-lawyers ... ." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble 2.
' CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 3, at 44.
'"A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law."
Id., Discip. R. 3-101 (A), at 46.
'As long, ago as 1938, K. N. Llewellyn, referring to the problem of unauthorized
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from a fear of competition from persons outside the legal profession and
from a realization that inroads are being made on what previously has
been the exclusive work of lawyers7 The present traditional methods of
lawyers in providing legal services have been challenged. Other organiza-
tions compete with lawyers for specialized, volume business of a routine
nature.' Some members of the public, *perhaps uncertain as to how to
locate a competent lawyer who is interested in rendering the particular
services desired,9 obtain legal services through organizations such as
practice as a problem of using the processes of law to define and protect a monop-
oly, wrote:
This paper looks to one thing only: to set out a little horse-sense about a
situation which when viewed little piece by little piece has not thus far
made too much sense for horse or man. Horse-sense about matters where
emotions stir, where both vanity and interest and worry and a profession
are involved-horse-sense about such matters commonly makes unpleasant
reading. The reason is simple: when we human beings are worried we do
and say silly things; when we are both worried about being crowded out
and vain of our own work, we are in a jam, and act accordingly. When
we look back on it, we mostly wish we hadn't. That is why it may be worth
using hindsight ahead of time, this time.
Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices-and C-ures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 104, 108 (1938).
' It was not until about twenty-five years ago apparently that lawyers first
began to feel apprehensive over the "unauthorized practice" situation. Then
it was corporate practice of law that was considered to be particularly
menacing. A lawyer writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1913 . . . sets
forth the manner in which corporations were taking away the lawyer's
business and concludes woefully: "The lawyer as such as is being devoured
by his own Frankenstein."
Foreword, The "Unauthorized Practice of Law" Controversy, 5 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 1-2 (1938).
8 It was also predictable that these organizations would attempt to preempt
routine transactions which occurred in large numbers with little deviation.
Thus arose collection agencies, title insurance companies, real estate agencies
and other institutions which specialized in one form of activity and adopted
new techniques to handle the volume.
Schwartz, Changing Patterns of Legal Services, in LAw IN A CHANGING AMERICA
109, 113 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).
* Few lawyers are willing and competent to deal with every kind of legal
matter, and laymen have difficulty in judging the competence of lawyers to
render different types of legal services. The selection of legal counsel is
particularly difficult for transients, persons moving into new areas, persons
of limited education or means, and others who have little or no contact with
lawyers.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2-Ethical Considerations 7, at
12-13.
The canons of ethics on business-getting are still built in terms of a
town of twenty-five thousand (or, much more dubiously, even fifty thousand)
-a town where reputation speaks for itself from mouth to mouth, even on
the other side of the railroad track .... Turn those same canons loose on
a great city, and the results are devastating in proportion to its size. If
1969]-
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associations to which they belong. Yet despite the emotional reverbera-
tions, activities of non-lawyers should be banned as constituting the un-
authorized practice of law only if the activities are inimical to the public
interest-not merely because the activities are competitive with lawyers. °
One of the important contributions of the proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility may prove to be its recurring insistence that the problems
of professional conduct be judged according to the interests of the
public.
PRACTICE OF LAW BY LAYMEN"
The prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is grounded
in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those who
undertake to render legal services. Because of the fiduciary character
of the attorney-client relationship and the inherently complex nature
of our legal system, the public can be assured of the requisite responsi-
bility and competence only if the practice of law is confined to those
who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon
members of the legal profession.12
Since the practice of law is, in the public interest, forbidden to anyone
who has not demonstrated the requisite competence and integrity, by
meeting the requirements for a law license,' 3 lawyers have a monopoly
in the rendition of legal services. The existence of this monopoly in the
important area of legal services, together with the fact that the practice
a small client does not know to whom to go, he does his pondering with all
the folk-lore about lawyers stalking blackly through his brain-they over-
reach, they overcharge, they are not to be trusted. This means, in result,
undone legal business. Or, it means turning to some non-lawyer who
undertakes to help out. Or, it means chancing it.
Llewellyn, supra note 6, at 115-16.
"o "The Bar's response to the rise of these other agencies was not so much to
change its own ways of handling its business as to rely upon unauthorized practice
doctrines to eliminate the competition." Schwartz, supra note 8, at 113.
The great majority of lawyers seem to be opposed to group legal services.
See, e.g., 13 Am. B. Nnws No. 11, Nov. 1968, at 6. At least some of the opposi-
tion may be based upon the competitive aspects of that method of furnishing legal
services. For example, a position paper of the Illinois State Bar Association has
been quoted as saying that "if groups were permitted to organize and employ
lawyers 'the days of the private practitioner . . . will be numbered."' Id.
"' See generally, Vorn Baur, What You Should Know About the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 4 STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1958, at 20.
"' CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 3-Ethical Considerations 1 1,
at 44.
" See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT., art. 320a-1, § 3 (1948) ("[A]II persons not
members of the State Bar are hereby prohibited from practicing law in this
State").
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of law is a profession,14 dictate that the directives in the proposed Code
be based upon serving the public interest. 5 Since the public interest is
served by forbidding laymen to practice law, it is against the public interest
for lawyers to aid or encourage laymen to practice law.
The apparent simplicity of the propositions that a layman should not be
permitted to practice law and that a lawyer should not aid a layman in the
practice of law turns into a quagmire of confusion when one attempts to
state specifically what it is that the unlicensed layman is not supposed
to do."8 Although "practice of law," like "obscenity," defies accurate
definition,' 7 the problems of unauthorized practice of law are often
approached on the basis of definitions which are focused too exclusively
upon the mechanics of a lawyer's work. Definitions such as "the use of
legal knowledge to help another person,"' "those acts ... which lawyers
customarily have carried on from day to day through the centuries... ,,, 9
and "to do the work, as a business, which is commonly and usually done
by lawyers here in this country"20 have generally proven to be either too
broad or too narrow. 2' They are not helpful primarily because they direct
attention to the competitive nature of the activities of the layman rather
than to the probability of harm to the public.
In contrast, the proposed Code of Professional Responsibility takes
1' "Historically there are three ideas involved in a profession: organization,
learning, i.e., pursuit of a learned art, and a spirit of public service. These are
essential. A further idea, that of gaining a livelihood is involved in all callings."
R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs 6 (1953).
1 See West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420
(1959), But cf. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 187-97
(1967).
1" See generally Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN, supra note 15, at 164-97.
1 Cf. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 3-Ethical Considera-
tions 5, at 45: "It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation
of a single, specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law."
18 Grammer, The Lawyer-Professiona or Tradesman?, 31 TEx. B.J. 1039,
1040 (1968). Query: under this definition, is a policeman practicing law when he
relies on his legal knowledge concerning crimes and arrests to detain a person
who is in the process of robbing an old lady at gunpoint?
"0 State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 87,
366 P.2d 1, 9 (1961). Does this definition mean that representing a litigant
in a lawsuit involving recent federal civil rights legislation is not the practice of
law?
2 Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940), quoting People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 338-
39, 125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919). Does this view mean that operation of a business
to collect past due accounts (i.e., a collection agency) necessarily is the practice
of law? See Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942).
" See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsoN, supra note 15, at 165.
1969]
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a* somewhat different approach to the determination of what constitutes
the practice of law. Stressing the client's need for the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer, it states:
Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for
others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence
of the professional judgment of a lawyer is his educated ability to
relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal prob-
lem. . . . Where this professional judgment is not involved, non-
lawyers ...may engage in occupations that require a special knowl-
edge of law in certain areas. But the services of a lawyer are essential
in the public interest whenever the exercise of professional legal
judgment is required.
2 2
The Code also gives another description of the nature of the lawyer's
professional judgment:
Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained
familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analytical
approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical commitment. 23
Several issues of fact may be involved in deciding whether any given
conduct constitutes the practice of law. Almost everyone is concerned as
to whether the conduct involves the use of legal knowledge or skill. Re-
liance-that is, whether the potential client is placing personal reliance
upon the other person to protect his interests or welfare in matters having
legal consequences-is also important.24 The philosophy of the Code
2 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 3-Ethical Considerations
5, at 45.28 Id., Canon 3-Ethical Considerations 2, at 44. Cf. id., Canon 6, at 60.
", While obviously involved in the concept of the unauthorized practice of law,
the reliance factor is not easy to pinpoint. Cf. Hull v. United States, 390 F.2d
462 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The underlying concern is that a client (i.e., the one receiving
the services in question) may not be competent to judge the quality of the services
rendered and has little choice but to place his confidence and trust in the person
rendering the services. Compare the following views.
Dacey's book [How to Avoid Probate] is sold to the public at large.
There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relationship of confidence or trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and client. This is the essential of legal practice-the
representation and advising of a particular person in a particular situa-
tion....
There is no personal reliance upon the selection and judgment of Dacey
in the discretionary choice of a form adapted to the customer's needs.
New York County Lawyer's Ass'n v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 161, -, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984,
998 (dissenting opinion), reV/d 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422
(1967) (on basis of the dissenting opinion).
A layman who seeks legal services often is not in a position to judge
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indicates that an even more important, factor is whether the situation is
one in which the professional judgment of a lawyer would be important
for the protection of the potential client.
If the conduct in question is determined to be the practice of law,
does it necessarily follow that the conduct should be prohibited?2 Bench
and bar may be appalled that this question could even be asked, but one
senses that this question today is being considered and answered, covertly
if not overtly. on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps the present wide range of views
and the existing vague standards as to what constitutes "practice of law"
are due in part to decisions, made on the basis of unarticulated factors, that
certain lay conduct is acceptable even though the conduct falls within
frequently used definitions of "practice of law." Stressing as a key factor
the need of the client for the professional judgment of a lawyer, as indi-
cated by the Code, may alleviate the decisional stresses; for a court, by
determining in an appropriate situation that there is little need for the
professional judgment of a lawyer, may hold-without obscuring the
basis for the decision- that the conduct, which might involve some sort
of advice as to a legal matter, is not the practice of law.
In the absence of an approach to unauthorized practice that involves
weighing the need for the professional judgment of a lawyer, courts may
increasingly be urged in the name of the public interest to approve conduct
of laymen that appears to involve the unauthorized practice of law.
whether he will receive proper professional attention. The entrustment of
a legal matter may well involve the confidences, the property, the freedom, or
even the life of the client. Proper protection of members of the public
demands that no person be permitted to act in the confidential and demand-
ing capacity of a lawyer unless he is subject to the regulations of the legal
profession.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 3-Ethical Considerations 4, at
44-45.
"That relationship of trust and confidence essential to the relationship of
attorney and client did not exist between the members of the respondent association
and its attorneys... ." People v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill.
102, 109, 187 N.E. 823, 826 (1933).
"A characteristic of professional service is that it is extremely difficult for the
client to evaluate its quality, at least until long after the event." Schwartz, supra
note 8, at 121.
" It is our opinion that on an occupation-by-occupation basis, some of the
legal restraints on lay competition should be lifted. Reputable and established
professions and businesses should be expressly authorized to perform certain
lawyer-like tasks now prohibited to them; but this should be allowed only
if the chances of clients being adversely affected are slight or if the clients
involved are fully informed on the risks entailed and quite able to absorb
any losses incurred from lay incompetence or dishonesty.
Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 15, at 549.
19691
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This prognostication is supported by several indications and considera-
tions. For example, various observers have suggested that the poor,
the disadvantaged, and the troubled can be advised on legal matters by
social workers, health department investigators, public health services'
psychologists and psychiatrists, local pastors, and the like.20 Legal aid
societies may and do furnish legal services to the poor." Is it a factor
favoring propriety that the lay person in question does not solicit or obtain
a fee for his services but performs the work gratuitously rather than as
an aid to, or as part of, his business ?2s Is it in the public interest to
permit an individual to receive services of a legal nature from a layman
if the recipient of those services has been unable to secure the services of
a lawyer, particularly if the nonlawyer who renders the services is
possessed of more legal competence than the usual layman?2 If the
expertise of lawyers and particular lay experts overlap, so that both the
"8See Sparer, Thorkelson & Weiss, The Lay Advocate, 43 U. DET. L.J. 493
(1966). See also Smith & Curran, A Study of the Lawyer-Social Worker Profes-
sional Relationship, in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS No.
6 (1968).
Broadly phrased unauthorized-practice-of-law statutes . . . could make
criminal many of the activities regularly done by social workers who assist
the poor in obtaining welfare and attempt to help them solve domestic
problems. Such statutes would also tend to deter programs in which experi-
enced welfare recipients represent other, less articulate, recipients before
local welfare departments.
Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 150 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
"Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1968), is
illustrative. In this case the court was confronted by a long line of decisions holding
that a for-profit corporation was practicing law when it furnished legal services of
its employee-attorneys to its customers. The court in Touchy held that a charitable
corporation "which acts merely as a conduit or intermediary to bring the attorney
and client together and does not purport to control or exploit the manner in which
the attorney represents his indigent client" is not practicing law. Id. at 695. In
Tnchy as well as in the prior cases the services of the employee-lawyers clearly
fell within the category of the "practice of law." Yet in the prior cases the con-
duct of furnishing the legal services was condemned (because of certain evils
regarding exploitation of the lawyers for corporate profit, divided loyalty of the
lawyers, etc.) while in Touchy it was recognized that the "'procuring of counsel
in a proper case is the performance of a needed public service."' Id.
See also In re the Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1934);
Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society, 117 Ohio App. 471, 185 N.E.2d 566 (1962).
" See Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143 (1967) (dissenting opinion). Cf.
Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
" See Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143 (1967) (dissenting opinion); White v.
Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (a prison inmate unable to obtain
the services of a lawyer desired to obtain the services of a more learned, experi-
enced inmate). Cf. Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963).
It is difficult to see how this particular problem could arise, however, if the
services of lawyers were fully available.
[Vol. 47
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
legal competence of the lawyer and the technical competence of the lay
expert are of substantial importance to the one receiving the services,
should the layman be permitted to render his services ?30 Where does the
public interest lie in the case of a nonlawyer who is in fact a law clerk
whose work is supervised, either specifically or generally, by a lawyer or
law firm ?"1 What should be done about one who is not licensed to render
the legal services in question only because he has failed to pay his bar
association dues ?32
PRACTICE OF LAW BY CORPORATIONS AND GROUPSas
'
It is said to be well settled that a corporation may not practice law.'
A corporation can act, of course, only through human instrumentalities
-its officers, agents and employees. If the person acting for the corpora-
tion is not a lawyer and is engaged in the practice of law, the problems
generally are the same as those encountered when any layman undertakes
to practice law. The added problem is that of applying sanctions directly
against the corporate entity. The statutes and decisions prohibiting the
practice of law by corporations facilitate the task of applying sanctions:
the corporation can be threatened, enjoined, prosecuted, etc., onl the theory
that it is unlawfully practicing law. 5
The picture changes hue, however, if the corporate employee who per-
forms the legal services is a lawyer. It is somewhat anomalous to say
that is is in the public interest to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law by nonlawyers because legal services should be rendered only by those
who by virtue of training and education possess the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer, and at the same time to say that it is the unauthorized
practice of law for a corporation or group to furnish the services of a
lawyer to another. The reason behind the rule is missing in those situa-
tions where the legal services are rendered in fact by a lawyer. There may
0 See Bancroft v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 203 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. La.
1962). Cf. Blumenberg v. Neubekcer, 12 N.Y.2d 456, 191 N.E.2d 269, 240 N.Y.S.2d
730 (1963).
" See People v. Alexander, 53 Ill. App. 2d 299, 202 N.E.2d 841 (1964).
" See Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
'" No attempt is made to define or discuss group legal services as such, for
"[e]very definition of group legal services is so broad as to include almost every
conceivable change in the existing patterns of providing legal services." Schwartz,
supra note 8, at 123.
"See generally Annot., 157 A.L.R. 282 (1945).
" See Q. Johnstone & D. Hopson, supra note 15, at 177-79; Sanders, Procedures
for the Punishment or Suppression of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 5 LAw &
CONTzmp. PRoB. 135 (1938).
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be other reasons in a given situation for prohibiting corporations or
groups from supplying the services of lawyers to others, 0 but the prohi-
bition is not supported by the public policy underlying unauthorized
practice doctrine, which tries to assure that each member of the public
will have the professional judgment of a lawyer when that judgment is
needed.
That there is nothing inherently evil about the furnishing of legal
services through a corporation is demonstrated by the ease with which
the legal professional adjusted to the use of professional legal corpora-
tions. A professional legal corporation is not regarded as being engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law, but it is closely regulated to guard
against other specific evils.
37
The fact that corporations are branded as being engaged in the un-
authorized practice of law when the corporation supplies the legal services
of lawyers to others might be of less importance were it not for the regu-
latory problems evidenced by three recent, well-known decisions: NAACP
v. Button," Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,0 and United
Mineworkers v. Illinois State Bar Association.40 In each of these disputes,
it was contended that the activities of the organization constituted the
unauthorized practice of law; and in each instance it was held that the
activities were constitutionally privileged under the first amendment.
"See, e.g., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Discip. R. 2-101, 2-102, &
6-108, at 19-21 & 69. Some of the potential evils are well catalogued in a recent
opinion of the Texas Professional Ethics Committee; in that opinion the committee
considered the possibility that a corporation is practicing law by furnishing the
services of its lawyer to subsidiary or closely related corporations and after men-
tioning the safeguards that should be taken, concluded that "the possibility of the
lawyer aiding his general corporate employer in the unauthorized practice of
law ... is more imagined than real." STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROFESSIONAL ETnIcs
CoMM!., OPINIoNs, No. 343, in RULES AND CANONS OF ETHICS 257, 259 (Supp.
No. 7, 1968) (publication of State Bar of Texas).
" See ABA CoM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OI"INOS, No. 303 (1967). The
opinion approved practice in corporate form, but was concerned with such ethical
problems as misleading firm names, interference by laymen with the lawyer's
professional judgment, and protection of the confidences of clients; cf. Empey
v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967). Consider also the right, even
duty, of a liability insurance company to furnish counsel to defend litigation brought
against its insured. See Knepper, Insurer's Duty to Defend: Recent Develop-
inents, 17 DEFENSE L.J. 391, - (1968) ("The duty to defend is separate and dis-
tinct from the obligation to pay a judgment rendered against the insured .. .
[it] exists regardless of the insurer's ultimate liability to the insured."). Cf. Pendle-
ton v. Pan American Fire & Cas. Co., 317 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1963).
"371 U.S. 415 (1963).
'377 U.S. 1 (1964).
,o389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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The ground rules for regulation of the practice of law in the area of
first amendment freedoms were stated in the three decisions. In Mine-
workers, it was said that "laws which actually affect the exercise of these
vital rights [to first amendment freedoms] cannot be sustained merely
because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within
the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in fact
provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil."'" In Mineworkers,
it was deemed significant that a decree against the conduct in question
was "not needed to protect the State's interest in high standards of legal
ethics."42 In Trainmen, it was pointed out that the conduct inveighed
against was "not a commercialization of the legal profession which might
threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the administration of jus-
tice ... 3 and that "the State again has failed to show any appreciable
public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out. itM
plan .... "4 In Button, it was stressed that regulations inthe arT e .f
first amendment freedoms must be drawn "with narrow specificity... ,,45
for "[t]he objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not
depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon un-
channeled delegation of legislative -powers, but upon the danger of
tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of -a
penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. 46
Button, Trainmen, and Mineworkers indicate that regulations de-
signed to affect the conduct of corporations and other groups in paying
for, recommending, or supplying lawyers to others must be specifically
and clearly aimed at a real and demonstrable evil.47 To label the conduct
the unauthorized practice of law'accomplishes little, for "a State cannot
foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,"4" and the
evil at which regulation of the unauthorized practice of law is directed
is the evil of allowing one other than a lawyer to make decisions that
should be made by a lawyer-which is not one of the evils involved when
11 Id. at 222.
a' Id. at 225.
"377 U.S. at 6.
"Id. at 8.
"371 U.S. at 433.
40 Id.
"7 The difficulty of regulating so-called group legal services was pithily stated
by Murray L. Schwartz who, in commenting on the Mineworkers decision, said,
"it is difficult to conceive of practical and attractive group legal arrangements that
would not be protected by the rule it announces." Schwartz, supra note 8, at 117,.,8 371 U.S. at 429.
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a corporation or other group supplies the services of a lawyer to another.
Threats to high standards of legal ethics obviously may be involved
in some situations in which the services of lawyers are supplied to others
by corporations or other groups. These threats involve dangers that may
also be found in other factual settings. For example, the loyalty of the
lawyer to the one receiving the services may be diluted by the wishes and
desires of the corporation to the extent that the lawyer's professional judg-
ment will be affected; or the corporation may exploit the lawyer's pro-
fessionalism and engage in a commercialization of the legal profession for
its own financial benefit. Regulation should be closely related to these
and other real dangers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility cannot and does not attempt
to regulate the conduct of corporations and other nonlawyers; yet it
does attempt to regulate the conduct of lawyers supplied by corporations
and other groups, but only in regard to specific evils.4"
THE UNAUTHORIZED LAWYER50
Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished primarily through
licensing procedures and by imposition of penalties in disciplinary actions.
This regulation has long been the function principally of the individual
states.51 Yet today our society is more mobile than ever before, and a
client's business interests may cross many state lines.52 As a result,
" See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Discip. R. 2-101 (Recommen-
dation of Professional Employment), 2-102 (Suggestion of Need of Legal Ser-
vices), 3-102 (Dividing Legal Fees With a Non-Lawyer), 5-101 (Preserva-
tion of Confidences and Secrets of Clients), & 6-108 (Avoiding Influence by
Others Than the Client), at 19, 20, 46, 55, & 69. The broad prohibition of Dis-
ciplinary Rule 3-101(A) that "[a] lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the un-
authorized practice of law," is limited by the provision of 3-101(C) that "[c]on-
duct permitted by the Disciplinary Rules of Canons 2 and 6 does not violate Dis-
ciplinary Rule 3-101." Id., Discip. R. 3-101, at 46.
"0 See generally Note, Attorneys-Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1711 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1711 (1967)].
Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the re-
spective states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any
jurisdiction is not per se a grant of the right to practice elsewhere, and it is
improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted
by law or by court order to do so.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIILITY, Canon 3-Ethical Considerations 1 9, at
46.
-See ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS, OPINIONS, No. 316 (1967).
It is also apparent that in some situations the local unpopularity of a person's
cause may be so strong that full protection of his legal interests may be best served
by employment of a lawyer from out of state. See Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d
241 (5th Cir. 1968).
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lawyers increasingly are called upon to give legal advice and assistance
(as well as to serve as advocates in litigation) in states in which they are
not licensed.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, perhaps because of its
premise that "[t]o lawyers, respect for the law should be more than a
platitude,"53 provides for the discipline of a lawyer who practices law
"in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of
the profession in that jurisdiction. 5 4 Yet at the same time the Code
deplores unreasonable territorial regulations, and so it also states that
"[iln furtherance of the public interest, the legal profession should dis-
courage regulation which unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon
the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the
opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in
the presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer
is not permanently admitted to practice." 5
Since it "is a matter of law, not of ethics, as to where an individual
may practice law, ' 6 most of the problems concerning the practice of law
by a lawyer outside the state where he offices and is licensed are not solved
by the proposed Code. The power to correct the situation lies with the
individual states in the exercise of their right to determine the qualifica-
tions for the practice of law.
Many remedies have been suggested. One proposal is to have a
nationally administered bar examination or a uniform bar examination,57
coupled with greater reciprocity in admitting to practice those licensed in
other states. But this remedy primarily aids the migrating lawyer rather
than the lawyer of one state whose client's affairs are involved in another
state or in several states.
A liberal policy of admission pro hac vice seems to be in existence
now,5 s but again the lawyer whose legal practice consists of out-of-court
"a CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1-Ethical Considerations
5, at 5-6.
" Id., Discip. R. 3-101 (B), at 46.
" Id., Canon 3-Ethical Considerations 9, at 46.
" ABA Comm. ON PROFESsIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 316 (1967).
"' See Coffman, A Uniform National Bar Examination: An Economical Im-
provement, 36 A.B.A.J. 623 (1950); Nationally Administered Bar Examinations,
7 J. LEGAL ED. 28 (1954) (panel discussion).
5" See Comment, Interstate and International Practice of Law, 31 S. CAL. L.
REv. 416 (1958); Note, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1711 (1967). Cf. Sanders v. Russell,
401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally Katz, Admission of Nonresident At-
torneys Pro Hac Vice, in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
No. 5 (1968).
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work receives little succor. A requirement that a local lawyer be associ-
ated is not always practical, and the requirement may be a needless
expense and burden on the client,5 9 particularly if local law is not in-
volved.
The state's interest in protecting the public against an out-of-state
lawyer lies primarily in the possibility that the lawyer is not competent
with regard to local law. A secondary consideration is that the state in
which the lawyer is licensed may not have sufficiently high standards con-
cerning character or integrity, and thus the out-of-state lawyer may not
meet local standards of integrity. When these two objections to practice
by an out-of-state lawyer are met, public interest may be served by recog-
nizing his right to practice law in the state even though he does not hold
a license from that state.6"
A state's interest in controlling those who provide legal services within
its boundaries may indicate that one who maintains an office within the
state or who regularly practices law within the state should be required
to comply with its licensing requirements. But the out-of-state lawyer
who only incidentally or occasionally engages in the practice of law
within the state generally should be permitted to do so, in the interest of
making legal services fully available, provided there is adequate assurance
of his integrity and competence. Adequate assurance of requisite character
and integrity is based upon the existence of high moral standards in the
state in which the lawyer primarily practices; there is reason to believe
that sufficiently high standards of character will soon be commonplace.
Adequate assurance that the out-of-state lawyer is competent in regard
to the legal matters he undertakes to handle locally is a more difficult
problem. There should be sufficient assurance, however, if he will be
See Int re Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966). Cf. Spanos
v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. dentied, 385 U.S. 987
(1966).
"' The states, of course, have legitimate interests in maintaining relatively
strict control over who may provide legal services within their jurisdictions;
they are properly concerned to insure both to their courts and to the litigants
in them that legal representation is provided only by men of sound ethics
who have an adequate mastery not merely of the general skills of a lawyer,
but of the particular features of the law of the state. Many of the present
methods of protecting these interests seem, however, at least equally suited
P vto serve the economic interests of the local bar .... [T]he desire of a
state to exclude outside economic competition of any form is hardly an
interest highly regarded in our federal system.
Note, 80 HA.v. L. Rzv. 1711, 1711-12 (1967).
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subjected to both financial"' and professional sanctions for incompetent
conduct. The likelihood that financial sanctions will be imposed depends
upon the status of the state's tort law concerning negligence and pro-
fessional malpractice,"2 and upon the tendency of clients to resort to the
courts for redress. The imposition of professional sanctions for incom-
petent conduct may be facilitated by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Canon 4 of the Code, stating that "A Lawyer Should Act Com-
petently and Use Proper Care in Representing Clients,"' contains a dis-
ciplinary rule proscribing certain incompetence and neglect. It provides,
for example, that a lawyer shall not "[h]andle any legal matter alone
when he knows or it is obvious that he lacks the competence to handle
the matter," 4 or "[n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him."' '65 The
applicability of such provisions to out-of-state lawyers permitted to prac-
tice law within the state, as well as to those possessing a local state license,
should be made clear by each state when it adopts the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It seems obvious, however, that the threat of sanctions
such as disbarment and reprimand by a state in which one practices
occasionally or incidentally does not have the same deterring effect as
a threat of professional sanctions by the state where one regularly prac-
tices.0 6 Therefore, the assurance of sufficient competency in part depends
upon the vigilance and ardor with which the home state of the lawyer en-
forces the standards of competency.6" But it is likely that each state in
adopting the Code will provide that any violation of a Disciplinary Rule,
regardless of the locale of the violation, may subject a lawyer to appro-
priate sanctions.68
6 Id. at 1719.
62 "Neither the Canons, the Ethical Considerations, nor Disciplinary Rules are
intended to suggest or define standards of liability in civil actions against lawyers
involving their professional conduct." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Preamble, at 2.
" Id., Canon 4, at 50.
"Id., Discip. R. 4-101(A) (3), at 51." Id., Discip. R. 4-101 (A) (4), at 51.
" See Note, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1711 (1967).
' Cf. Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968).
" [T]here is apparently no explicit understanding among any states that
questionable conduct in one jurisdiction will lead to an investigation in the
attorney's home state. At least there should be a formalized procedure for
the exchange of information between bar associations of the states; it may
be that present restrictions on the nonresident attorney will remain until
there is a sufficiently direct relationship between misconduct in one state
and disciplinary measures in another to act as a meaningful deterrent.
Note, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1711, 1728 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
Unauthorized practice problems have long plagued the Bar, and no
doubt will continue to do so for some time to come. The Bar may be
better able today than in some former decades to view the problems with
detachment, and thus to seek solutions that favor the public interest
irrespective of its own economic interests. The proposed Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility is not directly concerned with the unauthorized
practice of law, and it will be influential in this area only to the extent
that its approach and discussions are found to be persuasive. Many of
its provisions concerning the lawyer's relationship to the unauthorized
practice of law perpetuate existing views and existing restraints. Never-
theless, its stress upon the interests of the public (a stress found, for
example, in its attitude as to the type of conduct that should be con-
sidered to be the unauthorized practice of law and in its opposition to
unreasonable local restraints on practice by an out-of-state lawyer) indi-
cates that its impact will not be on the side of parochialism.
